Editorials

Whatever happened to Measure H? It was supposed to be a slam-dunk good-government measure that Berkeley voters would certainly support: campaign financing for all, leveling the playing field, taking money out of politics. Supporters sent the Planet a passel of literate, well-reasoned opinion pieces. We got some full-page ads. Letters came home in the mail outlining why thinking people would have to vote yes on H. The Berkeley vote was billed as an opening salvo in a national movement to “clean up politics.” But Berkeleyans didn’t buy it. Measure H went down badly, getting only 40 percent of the vote. Why? 

The easiest explanation is that that it was effectively an expenditure at a time when even Berkeley voters were thinking about saving money. Berkeleyans Against Soaring Taxes (BASTA), the anti-tax crowd, included Measure H on their very effective Vote-NO lawn signs. The voters, perhaps, were not in a mood to pay for anything new, since they also turned down libraries, kids and paramedics at the same time.  

A cursory glance at the city clerk’s list of those who contributed to the Berkeley Fair Elections Coalition’s Yes on H campaign shows that supporters came from all sorts of places: campaign consultants, high-priced lawyers, academics, computer types—but with a notable absence of the usual suspects. This did not seem to be a project funded by players to ensure their place on the ballot in the future. The contributors whose names we recognized were diverse and for the most part sincere.  

The organization’s web page boasted a really extraordinary list of progressive supporters, from Barbara Lee on down, with organizations such as the Sierra Club, Common Cause—you name it, they got them. Lee even supplied a well-placed pro-H op-ed to the Chronicle.  

The BFEC web page offered canned letters to the editor for supporters to crib from. Lucky for them that the Planet didn’t catch them at that before the election, since we’re allergic to the canned letter dodge even on behalf of “progressive” causes. This might, in fact, explain why the campaign was such a notable flop. It was perhaps another case of too many generals leading too few troops into possibly dubious battle. 

There’s another obvious explanation for why campaign financing didn’t catch on in Berkeley, at least this round. Many long-time observers of the political process have come to the conclusion that the main problem with campaign financing is—campaign financing. The political process which used to be fueled by volunteers has been turned over to often sleazy “consultants” who will work for anyone at a price. This causes candidates to spend more money than they need to, and to have less contact with voters. Proponents of H pointed to its provision which required candidates to get a substantial number of small contributions before qualifying for city funding, but that misses the point. New technologies make it possible to reach many voters without spending much money, if you have enough shoe leather donated to distribute handouts and can use a computer, and MoveOn.org’s record suggests that this might be a better way to go. Money in campaigns can easily distort them, and this can be true even if the money comes from taxes instead of from obvious interest groups. 

People who went to swing states to work against Bush came back with such critiques of the organizations they worked with. In general, MoveOn’s grassroots style got good reviews, while the Democratic National Committee, America Coming Together and the League of Conservation Voters efforts were panned by volunteers for being too top-down and too heavily staffed by inept paid workers who fell all over each other and didn’t get the job done. 

A lot of money was contributed to Kerry in this election, and a lot of observers are starting to complain that it was poorly spent. Perhaps after the dust settles we can learn something from these experiences.