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New Yorker regular Malcolm Gladwell has written a new book about instantaneous decision-making called Blink. The title would provide an apt characterization for the presidency of George W. Bush, whose actions often are based on little more than his gut-feelings. 

A prime example of the Bush decision-making process can be seen in his advocacy of the National Missile Defense (NMD) system. On Feb. 15 a NMD test aborted when an interceptor missile failed to get out of its silo, the latest in a series of debacles that stretch back to the inception of the program. Despite this woeful track record, the Bush administration continues to move forward with a multi-billion-dollar deployment of a system that doesn’t work now and, most likely, will never meet its objectives. 

The NMD system, as the Strategic Defense Initiative or “Star Wars,” was conceived in 1983, after Ronald Reagan shared a “dream” with his science advisor, Edward Teller. The basic idea seemed simple enough: If a missile is fired at the United States, our radar systems detect it, causing an interceptor rocket carrying an “exoatmospheric kill vehicle” to be launched; within minutes the kill vehicle climbs to the upper reaches of the atmosphere, finds the missile, and destroys it by ramming. 

This scenario presented a difficult technical challenge, comparable to designing a system to consistently hit one bullet with another; nonetheless, scientists initially were optimistic, believing that with specialized onboard computers, and sophisticated tracking radar, they could design a reliable kill vehicle. However, as development proceeded, the designers uncovered a major problem: the kill vehicle would likely not encounter a single target; instead it would intercept a cluster of warheads—one live and the others, decoys. 

The challenge of quickly discriminating between multiple potential targets has proved beyond the capability of modern technology. So far, there have been no successful tests conducted under realistic conditions. (Whenever the government reported a positive test, independent observers—most notably MIT scientist Theodore Postol—have quickly poked holes in the results, sometimes uncovering what appeared to be fraud.) 

Despite its abysmal track record, NMD has been supported by every president since Reagan—$51 billion dollars had been spent by the end of the Clinton presidency. It again became the cornerstone of US defense strategy when the Bush administration pushed a $100 billion dollar deployment through Congress in 2001. Last October, construction of the first stage of the system began at Fort Greeley, Alaska. Some estimate the ultimate cost of NMD as more than $1 trillion. 

Many ask why the US continues to fund a billion-dollar system that doesn’t work and, probably, isn’t needed. Even before 9/11, experts questioned the emphasis on missile defense given that the most likely threat to the US would come from a bomb delivered by conventional means—suitcase, container, truck, or airplane. Indeed, the most serious missile threat, North Korea, does not have the capability to hit the American mainland; it is their immediate neighbors—China, Japan, and South Korea—that are threatened.  

Bush “logic” propels NMD’s deployment. A dissection of the president’s rationale reveals a pattern, the same process involved in actions such as the war in Iraq or the “reform” of Social Security. The typical Bush decision is one-third pragmatism, another third obstinacy, and a final third “blink.” 

The pragmatic part stems from the political reality that continuing to build NMD is good for major Republican aerospace donors, such as Raytheon and TRW. Similarly, the war in Iraq may be bad for America, but it is good for Halliburton. 

NMD is a neo-conservative article of faith, and Bush and his advisers are true believers. Despite dramatic evidence to the contrary, they stubbornly hold on to the major Neo-con tenets, such as: Star Wars will make us safe; Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction; cutting taxes is good for everyone; and war is peace.  

The final ingredient in the Bush rationale is “blink,” seat-of-the-pants reasoning. Malcolm Gladwell argues that instantaneous decisions are best formed out of years of experience. In other words, it’s okay to reach quick decisions, but there should be an underlying “seasoned” process. The problem with most of Bush’s “blink” decisions is that there is no evidence of this foundation. What we see, instead, are snap decisions wrapped in authoritarian rigidity. Once Bush locks onto a solution to a problem, he won’t consider any other alternatives. For example, while North Korea has nuclear weapons and a missile-delivery system, the Bush administration assumes that NMD will protect the American mainland and, therefore, remains closed to all but military solutions to solve the danger of the rogue nation. The United States refuses to participate in real diplomacy. 

There are two other problems with the Bush “blink” style: Once the president makes a decision, however ill-considered, his administration demands that all Americans support it and labels those who dissent as “unpatriotic.” In addition, Bush tends to surround himself with “yea sayers,” partisans who will not question his rationale. As a result, there is no “feedback loop” that enables the White House to learn from mistakes. (In most decision environments, there is a simple feedback loop: adopting a policy, trying it out programmatically, evaluating the results, and taking corrective action based upon the lessons learned—for example, modifying or abandoning the policy.) Instead, the primary rule for Bush decision-making seems to be: never admit making a mistake. The administration places a premium on its image of resolute toughness and, therefore, believes it to be a sign of weakness to acknowledge any policy shortcomings. For this reason it is incapable of learning from its mistakes. NMD is a classic illustration of this weakness. 

While inventors and artists often succeed because of “blink” decisions, political leaders typically do not fare as well. History provides many examples of national leaders who let hubris overwhelm their judgment and, as a result, came to disastrous ends: Napoleon refused to listen to wise council that warned him of the perils inherent in an invasion of Russia; a century later, Adolph Hitler, no doubt believing himself the intellectual superior to the French Emperor, engaged in a second disastrous foray into Russia. Now George Bush, ruler of the strongest nation in the world, buoyant from winning the 2004 election, surrounded by advisers who know better than to argue against his impulsive judgment, makes one strategic error after another. The results are as predictable, as they are disheartening: Rather than strengthening the United States, Bush policies systematically weaken it. Rather than forging an intelligent, flexible defense for the homeland, the president proffers an unfeasible, wasteful alternative. 

Bush has probably never read about Thomas Andrews, a “blink” thinker best known as the designer of the Titanic. Andrews went along on the maiden voyage of the great ship, knowing that it carried far too few lifeboats, but feeling secure because he supposed that the vessel was indestructible. 

Sheltered by his unique decision-making style, George Bush sleeps soundly, believing that because of NMD, and the other ill-considered policies of his administration, the United States is impregnable. Meanwhile, the good ship, America, steams unaware into the cold, iceberg-laden sea. 

Bob Burnett is a Berkeley writer and activist. He can be reached at bobburnett@comcast.net.